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From the respect of different cultures to the value of cultural difference* 
 
Culture and values 
 
 Most debates on the governance of multicultural societies seem to assume a notion of 
culture that anthropologists would consider ‘outdated’.1 That is, they seem to view culture as a 
static, constant, unchanging entity (see Becker 1950, 251; Devlin1965, 10), a locked and sealed 
box, “a set of beliefs that is being imposed unchanged upon individuals generation after generation” 
(Sunder 2001, 511), shaping “distinctive goals that need not be shared by other kinds of society” 
(Benedict 1934, 46-7). Culture is considered as the distinctive element of a given society, an 
element that defines the values directing actions and the ultimate goals they are supposed to pursue 
(Sewell 1999, 39). 
 
 From my point of view, such a conception of culture has been successful because of its 
intimate connection with the solution to the problem of order proposed by liberal thought—a 
solution based on an individualist conception of action. Such a conception analyzes collective 
action in terms of individual choice, and conceives of the political and social order as a by-product 
of the sharing of the same values and the pursuit of the same ends by the individuals making up a 
society.2 The theories of the social and political order that characterized the last half century-- from 
neo-contractarian ones to those focusing on the governance of multicultural societies-- all assume 
that ends determine individuals’ actions. Discussion mainly concerns whether, and how far, 
different kinds of ends appear as suitable foundations for social order: do we need ‘values’, hence 
                                                
* I am grateful to Pietro Costa, Tecla Mazzarese, Lucia Re, Francesco Belvisi, Realino Marra, Paola Parolari, Francesco 
Vertova, Leonardo Marchettoni and Filippo Ruschi, for their comments on a previous version of this paper. Their 
remarks and suggestions have been crucial to help me make numerous arguments clearer. I am also grateful to all 
participants in the Symposium International sur l’interculturalisme – Dialogue Québec-Europe, held in Montreal on 25-
27 May 2011. Their contributions and our discussions during the three days of the conference taught me very much; 
they forced me to review many of my ideas and allowed me to emphasize many others. 
1 The most striking exception to this tendency is surely Seyla Benhabib’s work, that explicitly refers to Clifford 
Geertz’s notion of culture and James Clifford’s views in order to emphasize the dynamic and ‘hybridizing’ dimension 
of cultures. See also Phillips 2007. Critical considerations on the essentialist notion of culture can also be found in 
Parekh 2000. 
2 This paradigm has proven capable to resist contrary evidence for over one century. Even today, when citizens of 
Western democracies want to get something done, they are likely to create voluntarist social movements. The 
conviction that social groups – indeed society itself – are constituted by the voluntary choices of individuals is so deeply 
rooted in Western liberal democratic culture that it obscures the fact that our institutional life is dominated by 
bureaucratic states, large corporations, and by an impersonal market running many spheres of life without voluntary 
individual cooperation. 
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shared ends? Or can order be based also on ‘interests’, hence on rationally arguable ends?3 Can 
order be based on tastes (or preferences), i.e. on idiosyncratic ends?4 
 
The idea that culture-- conceived of as the set of values of a given group-- can solve the 
problem of the political order was proposed in the middle of the twentieth century by Talcott 
Parsons.5 According to Parsons, a non-deviant group member is an individual capable of 
internalizing the ultimate ends and values (‘culture’, in the classical approach) that enable him or 
her to fulfill the other members’ expectations about her behavior. In Parsons’ theory, values --which 
explain why different people make the same choices6-- are abstract, general and immanent to the 
social system. They do not have a complex history shaped by interests, political or religious 
vicissitudes, practical needs, etc.; at least in the medium term, they are the unmoved mover 
(Aristotle) of social action. In the following decades, such a conception became connected with the 
notion of citizenship that T.H. Marshall (1963) defined, in his groundbreaking work, as “a kind of 
basic human equality associated with the concept of full membership of a community”. Since the 
1980s,7 “full membership of a community” became translated as “full mastery of a culture”, with 
culture being understood as a set of values that characterizes a given (national) group and originates 
from a pre-political bond shared by its members. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that the classical notion of culture as the matrix of ultimate ends and 
values towards which individual actions should be directed if they are to ground the political order, 
remains stuck within a tendency, highlighted by Isaiah Berlin (1969), to see the values of the liberal 
tradition as perfectly compatible and non-conflicting.8 It should be added that, as argued by Harold 
Garfinkel (1967; see also Wrong 1961) in his critique of Parsons’ views, this conception of culture, in 
spite of its link with the liberal individualist conception but always in its desperate attempt to provide 
order with a solid ground, ends up drawing a picture of the individual as a passive “cultural dope”. 
                                                
3 Cf. e.g. John Rawls’s account in Political Liberalism that defines an interest-based order as a modus vivendi and 
considers it less stable than a value-based order. 
4 See Hirschman’s famous The passions and the interests, in which he describes how private vices become legitimated 
as the basis of the new market-based economic order and Vilfredo Pareto’s theory of equilibrium. On the difficulties 
raised by the use of such literature to provide for a foundation of the political order, see Sen 1977; Arrow 1963; 
Runciman – Sen 1965.  
5 It is worth mentioning that Talcott Parsons explicitly proposes his theory as a synthesis of the various Western theories 
that refuse to accept Hobbes’s solution of the problem of order, and as the only way of escaping a foundation of order 
based on its imposition through the Leviathan. 
6 Parsons (1951, 11-2) explicitly states, right at the beginning of The Social System, that cultures orient people’s action 
towards certain ends rather than others by defining their values. For he holds that a cultural tradition provides people 
with “values orientations”, and defines “value” as “an element of a shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion 
or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation”.  
7 I am referring of course to communitarians’ positions; seeWalzer (1983, chap. 2) and Sandel (1992, 12-28). 
8 In the twentieth century Marxist views of Gramscian origin on cultural hegemony, too, contributed to such 
perceptions. 
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Garfinkel and ethnomethodologists can by no means be charged with overestimating the capacities 
of social actors. They did not work out a social theory that sees the social actor as a “strong 
evaluator”, unlike, e.g., Charles Taylor (1976). Their theory makes little room for the individual, as 
shows their use of the expression ‘competent member’, instead of ‘actor’. Such a phrasing does not 
emphasize the subjectivity of a ‘person’, so much as her ‘mastery of the language’, her 
communicative competence and her membership: her possessing cognitive procedures shared by all 
members of the community. The “competent member” is a colorless figure totally constrained by 
the context of his forms of life, but at the same time active. Basically, she is “somebody who 
interprets his practices as rational with reference to assumed rules and cultures: a craftsman of 
social work who is cleverly and skillfully reconstructing his acting in the social world for his 
particular practical reasons” (Giglioli - Dal Lago 1983, 48).9 
 
Even though this notion of culture fits well with the Western, liberal and modern, 
Weltanschauung, it has been effectively criticized in the anthropological debates of the last fifty 
years. In my view, it is chiefly flawed because it confuses discussions about order in multicultural 
societies. Being more concerned with the liberal tradition than with the conceptual tools with which 
people describe the local orders characterizing their own lives, it led to the elaboration of theories 
that make it quite hard to propose a solution of the problem of governing multicultural societies. On 
the one hand, the classical conception of culture has led to naturalize and neutralize the colonialist 
approach according to which any local or ethnic community has a corresponding specific culture. 
Hence, it also consolidated the reification of the notion of culture and, following Parsons’ teaching, 
its conceptualization as a sort of monad impervious to external influences and, ultimately, 
immutable. On the other hand, the classical conception led to conceptualize all differences between 
people from different environments as being conflicts of values, hence of cultures, and to the view 
that an orderly peaceful coexistence requires shared values,10 hence a shared culture as their 
receptacle. 
  
Following this approach, recent theoretical-political debates have point to the clash between 
conflicting values –that is, between different cultures—as the main problem of the contemporary 
world. As a consequence, theorizing has focused on how to harmonize several different values, both 
                                                
9 Giglioli and Dal Lago (1983, 24) stress that it is hard “to imagine a more bloodless social world, in which the concepts 
of goal and project are missing and individuals are so fully immersed in trivial repetitive routines, than the world 
described by ethnomethodologists”.  
10 In fact, Parsons sees conflicts between members of the same social group, who share the same values by his 
definition, as resulting themselves from failed socialization and a source of deviance. A similar view about the basic 
values of social coexistence is argued by Rawls in Political Liberalism. See Santoro 2003, 242-253. 
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worldwide and within individual states. The reasoning goes roughly as follows: in order to make 
our societies and our rights more stable, we should make every possible effort to build a consensus 
of all citizens (either of the whole world or of a specific state, depending on the case at hand) on a 
set of basic liberal values. This approach characterizes Charles Taylor’s and Jürgen Habermas’s 
dialogical theories, as well as John Rawls’s theory of overlapping consensus and Will Kymlicka’s 
(1995) theory of multicultural citizenship11.  
 
Yet, despite the popularity of the binomial made of this notion of culture and the theory of 
individual action among philosophers and political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists have 
stressed for many years that what individuals want is of very little help in explaining their actions. 
People may share ends and values and nonetheless keep behaving in radically different ways, for 
they use different ‘cultural’ tools that produce different configurations of the objects and actions 
that make up their social world. What allows us to understand people’s actions is not their values, 
which are often too general and inconsistent to justify a host of contradictory actions, so much as 
their habits, their conceptual tools and their behavioral styles. In other words, actions are not 
determined by values; they depend on the cognitive competences made available by a culture. More 
precisely, the adoption of a given course of action is normally premised on two elements: an idea of 
the world in which one is going to act and a feeling-- mostly dependent on others’ reaction-- that 
one can trust her perception of her own behavior as appropriate. If this feeling is lacking, people 
experience a ‘cultural shock’; they sense that they are interacting with an environment different 
from their own culture. 
 
Since Clifford Geertz’s groundbreaking work on The Interpretation of Culture, most 
anthropologists have argued that the reassuring view that culture includes shared ends that enable one 
to behave as a ‘competent’ member of society should be abandoned and replaced by a conception of 
culture as a set of symbolic resources through which people experience the world and give it a meaning 
(Keesing, 1974). Culture influences and directs people’s actions, making them predictable and 
acceptable; but it does so by providing the cognitive -- more than evaluative--  resources through which 
individuals organize their own ‘strategies’12 and at the same time bring about shared social processes 
                                                
11 According to Kymlicka’s theory, ‘cultural’ minorities are entitled to retain their traditions in order to live 
autonomously as far as they do not cause any restrictions for the rights of their members—namely, to the extent that the 
values directing their actions are compatible with the cultural values of the (western) society as a whole. 
12 I bracket ‘strategies’ because the word might suggest a planning of individually considered actions, whereas I rather 
want to point to ways of organizing action that are often dependent, among other things, on cognitive tools, customs, 
habits, and past experience. The cognitive tools that make up cultures often synthetic, rather than analytic, tools that do 
not give meaning to each individual element of the surrounding world but to complex pieces of it. In other words, the 
strategic action I am referring to is not the one tackled by theories of rational action, but rather the one that has been 
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(Hannertz, 1969, 184). In this conception, culture provides a ‘toolkit’ of resources from which people 
can construct diverse strategies of action. To construct such a strategy means selecting certain cultural 
elements (both tacit, such as attitudes and styles, and explicit, such as rituals and beliefs), and investing 
concrete life circumstances with their particular meanings. If we follow this argument, culture is not 
confined to orienting individuals’ actions through the cognitive tools and the action strategies it makes 
available; it triggers, causes these actions, and cognitive and strategic tools--more than values-- emerge 
as the actual engines of actions. There are no individuals who want to pursue an end and look for the 
cultural tools to achieve it; there are individuals who choose available categorizations and action 
strategies and, by choosing them, implicitly choose the values that may be seen as underlying them. 
 
This is not to say that in such a conception values disappear or, by overcoming Hume’s law, are 
seen as following from ways of knowing the world we live in. But it allows to emphasize that, pace 
neo-positivists, the ways of ‘seeing’ facts, things, actions, and the language used to describe them 
always embody value orientations.13 Values determine action by being implicit in interpretive and 
cognitive schemes, much more than because they would be ultimate ends to pursue. In other words, 
values as such hardly ever influence everyday actions: it is quite unusual for us to raise the problem 
whether, by acting in a certain manner, we harm a certain value or uphold another. Values 
determine our actions because they are part of our cognitive tools, of our ways of conceptualizing in 
which context we happen to act and which strategic resources are available to us. People do not 
build lines of action from scratch, choosing actions one at a time as efficient means to ends 
subjectively (tastes, idiosyncratic interests) or culturally (values, objective interests) given. Instead, 
they construct chains of action beginning with at least some ready built links. Culture influences action 
through the shape and organization of those links, not by determining the ends to which they are put. 
Indeed, if culture would influence action through end values, people in changing circumstances would 
hold on to their preferred ends while altering their strategies for attaining them. But if culture provides 
the tools with which persons construct lines of action, then styles or strategies of action will be more 
                                                                                                                                                            
analyzed by Erving Goffman in his The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life. According to Goffman, the actor is 
able to choose his stage and his ‘straight man’ (in the theatrical jargon), just like he is free to choose the most suitable 
costume. The actor’s main goal is to preserve expressive coherence, adapting to the various stages that are proposed to 
him. Goffman insists on the importance of a shared definition of interaction to preserve the latter’s coherence. In 
interaction—staging-- participants can be at the same time actors and audiences. Actors usually try to establish the most 
favorable images of themselves and encourage other people in a variety of ways to accept their preferred definition of 
the situation. Goffman acknowledges that – when the accepted definition of the situation has lost credibility – some or 
all actors may pretend that nothing has happened, if they find such a strategy useful or wish to keep peace. For instance, 
when a lady attending a formal dinner – who is certainly striving to appear favorably - stumbles, bystanders may 
pretend they did not see her clumsy behavior: they support her attempt to ‘save face’. Goffman insists that this kind of 
deliberate fictitious gullibility appears at all levels of social organization, from the empire to the ghetto. 
13 For instance, to speak of the euthanasia of a terminally ill person-- that is, of a compassionate act respecting her 
dignity-- or of her homicide, are two ways of describing the same situation which entail a different value judgment. 
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persistent than the ends people seek to attain: people will come to value ends for which their cultural 
equipment is well suited (Mancini, 1980). 
 
Culture affects individuals’ actions by shaping a common ‘language’ that enables “speaker and 
listeners [...] to feel and somehow to attest the objective production and deployment of common sense 
knowledge, of practical actions and their circumstances” (Garfinkel & Sacks 1970, 342)14. Thus, 
culture is a toolkit containing symbols, rituals, and worldviews, with their associated user’s manuals15, 
that people use to figure out and solve the problems they encounter in their lives. It may be taken to be 
an explanatory element of action not because it defines people’s ends, but because it provides the 
elements through which people build up their ‘strategies’ of actions, often in a thoughtless and 
automatic way disconnected from the explicit pursuit of some end. And, most importantly, we can 
speak of culture if the same elements, on which action is built, enable us to make sense of the 
strategies of people inhabiting the actor’s environment. 
 
Culture understood as a ‘toolkit’ is very similar to what Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 82-3) defined as 
‘habitus’, i.e. “a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, 
functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible 
the achievement of infinitely diverse field tasks, thank to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the 
solution of similarly shaped problems”. While this notion of culture views it as strongly conditioning 
its users’ chances of action, it nonetheless makes room for conceptualizing individuals as its active-- 
sometimes skilled—users, and minimizes the problem of values’ and ends’ homogeneity. 
Contemporary debate on the notion of culture is premised on the assumption that human beings are not 
mindless cultural automatons and that cultures are not unified systems which push action in a 
consistent direction. Together with ethnomethodologists, we acknowledge that the social actor is a 
‘competent member’ who cannot free himself of his language but at the same time controls it by using 
it in many different ways and contexts to pursue very different ends: as it is well known to the 
theologians, every reader of the Bible can find a passage to justify almost any act (Swidler 1986, 277). 
  
This conception of culture allows us to see how cultural experience may reinforce or refine the 
skills, habits, and attitudes important for common strategies of action. But established ways of acting 
                                                
14 I emphasize that the development of this language does not require linguistic unity. Linguistic unity surely favors its 
spread but, as shown by the example of Switzerland, it can also spread without it. On the other hand, a shared natural 
language does not guarantee the establishment of a common ‘language’. On the fact that “language invites unity, 
without, however, compelling it” cf. E. Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? 
15 It might be more correct to say that cultures provide a reference to some indicators on the appropriateness of each tool 
to circumstances. However, any definition of circumstances depends on cultural tools themselves. 
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do not depend upon such immediate cultural support. As Ulf Hannertz (1969, 186) stressed in his 
important study on ghetto culture, “when people develop a cultural repertoire by being at the receiving 
end of cultural transmission, this certainly does mean that they will put very part of it to use. Rather, 
the repertoire to measure constitutes adaptive potential. While some of cultural goods received may be 
situationally irrelevant, such as most of that picked up at the movies, much of that derived from school, 
and even some of that encountered within the ghetto community, other components of an individual's 
repertoire may come in more useful”. 
 
The problem of inconsistency--or even inner contradiction-- of cultures hardly ever arises in 
practice, for individuals at any given time choose the strategies of action that they think more 
appropriate and have a minimum of assertability conditions guaranteed by the people they interact 
with, because they are part of the kit of shared cognitive tools and strategies. Still, Hannertz’s quotation 
tells us something more: once culture is seen as a toolkit, its original unity looses much relevance. 
Individuals always have different cognitive tools to give meaning to situations and different behavioral 
strategies available; whether these come from the same ‘culture’ or from different cultures is not very 
important, and is often just a matter of historical account. What matters is the degree of assertability 
supporting this toolkit-- in Nelson Goodman’s metaphor, its level of ‘entrenchment’.16 
 
Culture and social complexity 
 
A notion of culture as a repertoire of cognitive and strategic resources seems to me fruitful 
for approaching the problem of governing multicultural societies in an age in which, owing to the 
vast possibilities of communicating discourses, life styles and world views, and the relative ease for 
people to move, the coexistence and contact between different ‘cultures’17 is part of everyday life. 
                                                
16 For Goodman (1983) a predicate is ‘entrenched”’ when its usage (its ‘projection’) appears natural. Similarly, a way of 
categorizing a situation, a strategy of action, may be said to be ‘entrenched’ when it appears natural to the other actors 
that are interacting in the same situations, or are called upon to evaluate it. Of course, alternative categorizations and 
strategies may be equally entrenched and therefore appear equally ‘natural’ in a given situation, whereas at times some 
appear less ‘natural’ than others, even if they have a certain degree of legitimacy and entrenchment,. How much each 
element of the equipment of cultural tools is entrenched is a historical and sociological problem, to be assessed in every 
contingent situation. 
17 Almost a century ago, in his groundbreaking discussion of cultural conflicts, Sellin (1938a, 63) defined as “primary” 
the conflicts that arise from these contacts. In his view they happen: 1) when different codes collide on the frontier 
between contiguous cultural areas; 2) when the laws of a group are imposed upon another group as a consequence of 
operations of conquest of the latter’s territory; 3) when members of a group emigrate to another with totally different 
cultural codes. I will not dwell here on his sophisticated analysis (still very useful) of the third case. I will confine 
myself to stressing that Sellin considered conflicts of the second type, which happen “when East meets West”, 
especially relevant. I am indebted to the reading of Paola Parolari’s insightful doctoral dissertation for the discovery 
that Sellin’s views were actually part of a broader debate. American anthropologists between the two World Wars 
studied these cultural exchanges under the label – in truth not very fitting – of “acculturation”. See the American 
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We need not endorse Zygmunt Bauman’s view of liquid modernity, nor to naively emphasize the 
static character of ancient and classic modern societies to accept that dialogue between ‘cultures’ is 
a distinctive feature of our societies. While such a dialogue has always been changing cultures 
themselves, today it no longer takes place between a few cultures, through a slow (earlier centuries 
long, later decades long) process of change, but continuously, with high-intensity contacts between 
many different ‘cultures’. This requires a very quick adaptation that makes it quite difficult to keep 
thinking of cultures as static elements, even in the short term. 
  
Besides this continuous contact among cultures, there is another phenomenon that is often 
seen as different and neglected by debates on governing multicultural societies—a phenomenon that 
has the same origin and a quite similar impact: the continuous impetus to use traditional conceptual 
tools and action strategies in an unusual way, namely, to apply them to events and circumstances for 
which they would not have been seen as relevant before. While this phenomenon has always 
existed,18 today it is heightened by the so-called ‘cultural industry’ (that feeds on this stimulation) 
and by the speed of technological progress (that creates quite new situations in different domains, 
from medicine to the ways we relate to each other, situations that lack consolidated routines for 
their description and handling). 
 
Let us think for example of the bio-ethical issues raised by the development of science and 
bio-technologies: when does life begin? When does life end? What is an embryo? People 
responsible for deciding problems concerning euthanasia, predictive medicine, genetic information 
and manipulation, are faced with questions that not only have no legal solution, but also, no shared 
moral answer. In Parsons’ language, there are no shared values directing action so that they do not 
appear deviant to substantial sectors of social group members. This is because in this sector the 
speed of the evolution of medical technology often prevents the consolidation of a language that 
allows us to base decisions on “the objective production and deployment of common sense 
knowledge, of practical actions and their circumstances” (Garfinkel & Sack 1970, 342). Hence, 
there is today in Italy a heated debate on the patient’s right (established by article 32 of the 
constitution) to refuse medical treatment and on whether government can impose a given treatment 
while respecting a person’s dignity. Of course, the question particularly concerns the cases in which a 
                                                                                                                                                            
Anthropologist Memorandum, R. Redfield , R. Linton, M.J. Herkovits, Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation, in 
“American Anthropologist”, 38 (1936), n. 1, pp. 193-205. 
18 Thorsten Sellin (1938a; 1938b) already distinguished between two kinds of cultural conflicts: ‘primary’ conflicts, that 
emerge between two different cultures,  and ‘secondary’ conflicts develop within the same culture. According to Sellin, 
the latter take place with the society’s passage from being a simple one  to being a complex one, i.e., when social 
differentiation increases and subcultures multiply. 
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refusal of treatment turns into a form of suicide. But a careful analysis shows that, contrary to common 
opinion, the debate does not rise from differences about values and value systems, so much as from 
divergences in the connotation and denotation with which people invest such situations. This is 
because values become relevant in that they are embodied in the reconstruction of circumstances.19 
Similarly, most debates on abortion that are normally described as stemming from value differences 
between those upholding the priority of life and those upholding women’s self-determination, in 
fact seem to derive from the lack of a common language that would account for the status of the 
fetus: the clash seems to be one between those conceiving of the fetus as a beholder of rights, on the 
one hand, and those considering it an object ‘owned’ by the mother, on the other one. In fact, the 
problem is that it is very difficult for a language to emerge that does not conceive of the fetus as 
either a person or an appendix of the mother, but as a sui generis entity-- as a fetus (Wolgast, 1987). 
 
I think these phenomena are the problems that our societies face today: problems that are 
continuously raised (by the scientific-technological system, cultural industry, different cultural 
equipments), are formulated in specific languages, and about which group members often feel they 
do not have a shared language available that can play the role that shared culture has always been 
supposed to play—namely,  “to attest the objective production and deployment of common sense 
knowledge, of practical actions and their circumstances” (Garfinkel & Sacks 1970, 342). However, I 
think that we should look at them as the starting point from which to work out possible solutions to 
the problem of social order; the conception of culture highlighted by anthropological (and 
sociological) debates in recent years can help us very much in this operation. 
  
Actually, recent anthropological and sociological debates on the notion of ‘culture’ seem to 
me very helpful in dealing with new political challenges. The conception of culture that emerges 
surely is less reassuring than the classical one, if one thinks of the automatic perpetuation of the order 
we are used to live in, but it is much more reassuring if we are looking for a chance of building an 
order in multicultural societies. For if we approach the issue of governing these societies on the basis of 
the classical notion of ‘culture’, we need to think in terms of socially shared values and principles that, 
pace Parsons and Rawls, have always been and today are increasingly perceived as incompatible and 
incommensurable. Hence, if we keep thinking of culture as an axiological monad, to accept a 
behavior that breaks one’s values and principles appears as a sacrifice of the ‘culture’ itself, and its 
                                                
19 Besides the above-mentioned distinction between those seeing a suicide and those seeing a euthanasia, we should 
remember the attempt, currently made by the Italian parliament, to pass a law that would redefine the concept of 
‘medical treatment’ by establishing that force-feeding of comatose people should be seen as a ‘treatment’ and therefore 
can be adopted by physicians if a fully aware person expressly refuse it, without considering a possible previous will. 
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occurrence cannot but be thought of and lived by those who do not share it as an act of violence that 
damages the environment that nurture their personality. If we rather think of the problem not as one 
of compatibility between values and principles but as one of dialogue between individuals having 
different symbolic toolkits, then the issue is completely different. For people are not one-
dimensional, nor are they coherent, as far as theoretically incommensurable arguments intersect in 
their lives. When people tackle their problems and look for solutions, different (religious, political, 
economic, moral, legal) principles are normally displaced in different times and domains of their 
lives, so that individuals often manage to heed incompatible principles; or, on the contrary, 
principles are placed on the same level as affections, idiosyncrasies and personal tastes and interact 
with them.20 In the latter case, a solution is often found by means of a trade off between 
theoretically incommensurable goods, a trade off that only subjective temporary sensitivity may 
deem acceptable or not. 
The trap of unsettled societies 
 
Ann Swidler’s distinction between ‘settled’ and ‘unsettled’ lives seems to me to shed light on 
the prospects that a conception of culture as a toolkit opens for an analysis of our societies. For 
Swidler, the distinction between ‘settled’ and ‘unsettled’ lives depends upon culture’s role in sustaining 
existing strategies of action and in constructing new ones. She defines ‘settled’ lives lived within a 
social environment in which “culture is intimately integrated with action” and “it is most difficult to 
disentangle what is uniquely ‘cultural’, since culture and structural circumstance seem to reinforce 
each other”. In these societies-- those masterly studied by Clifford Geertz (1973, 87-125)-- “culture is a 
model of and a model for experience; and cultural symbols reinforce an ethos, making plausible a 
world-view which in turn justifies the ethos” (Swidler 1978, 278). We could say, metaphorically, that 
‘settled lives’ are lives lived in ‘settled societies’, or, as Swidler herself mentions in a passage, in 
‘settled periods’. But what makes a society or a period ‘settled’? It is the fact that the toolkit of 
cognitive and strategic resources available to actors is consolidated and firmly entrenched, so that the 
ways in which individuals categorize events and work out their strategies are obvious to their 
interlocutors: they take them for granted, hence surely acceptable. As Swidler writes, 
within established modes of life, culture provides a repertoire of capacities from which 
varying strategies of action may be constructed. Thus culture appears to shape action 
                                                
20 On this point see James March (1978, 596) who, in his critique of the theory of rational choice, emphasized that 
“choices are often made without respect to tastes. Human decision makers routinely ignore their own, fully conscious, 
preferences in making decisions. They follow rules, traditions, hunches, and the advice or actions of others. Tastes 
change over time in such a way that predicting future tastes is often difficult. Tastes are inconsistent. Individuals and 
organizations are aware of the extent to which some of their preferences conflict with other of their preferences; yet 
they do nothing to resolve those inconsistencies. [...] While tastes are used to choose among actions, it is often also true 
that actions and experiences with their consequences affect tastes”. 
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only in that the cultural repertoire limits the available range of strategies of action. 
[…] Although internally diverse and often contradictory, they provide the ritual 
traditions that regulate ordinary patterns of authority and cooperation, and they so 
define common sense that alternative ways of organizing action seem unimaginable, 
or at least implausible (Swidler 1986, 284). 
Thus, in ‘settled societies’ it is normal to see values as organizing and anchoring patterns of action, in 
the same way, e.g., that one can expect to see the sun going round the earth every day. This does not 
mean, though, that no culture or, better, no cultural tradition imposes a single, unified pattern on action, 
in the sense of imposing norms, styles, values, or ends on individual actors: traditional adages usually 
come in pairs counseling opposite behaviors. 
 
Once we give up the reassuring traditional approach (formalized by Parsons’ theory) that 
culture is a coherent whole that influences how groups organize action via enduring psychological 
proclivities implanted in individuals by their socialization, traditional or national culture becomes less 
important in securing the social order. True, culture provides the materials from which individuals and 
groups construct strategies of action, and it is clear that publicly available meanings facilitate certain 
patterns of action-- making them readily available-- while discouraging others. Nevertheless, in every 
society cultural resources are diverse, and usually, groups and individuals call upon these resources 
selectively, having different styles and habits of action apply in different situations. The fact that 
strategies and the very connotations of situations may diverge does not mean that culture does not 
direct and determine action. In these societies, individuals do active cultural work to maintain or refine 
their cultural capacities; however, these capacities do not make up a set of values guaranteeing 
agreement but rather represent a toolkit enabling people to articulate how they are to consider, and 
behave in, a variety of situations. To use a metaphor by Michel Polanyi (1966), we can say that in 
settled societies cognitive and strategic tools become part of a culture when they are a ‘tacit dimension’ 
of action, that is, when they become ways of acting and seeing that, being shared by a whole group, are 
considered obvious and therefore not needing a systematic articulation. It is precisely their immunity 
from the requirement of strict in-depth analysis that allows them to coexist, however inconsistent and 
contradictory they may be. 
 
Societies and periods cease to be ‘settled’ when the repertoire of traditional cognitive and 
strategic resources is called into question. Swidler (1986, 278) associates this phenomenon with the 
emergence of new ideologies: ‘unsettled periods’ are described as those in which “ideologies – 
explicit, articulated, highly organized meaning systems (both political and religious) – establish 
new styles or strategies of action”. New ideologies challenge the entrenchment of existing cultural 
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practices and try to create the conditions for becoming entrenched in their place. It is not enough that 
somebody puts forward some alternative definition of the situation or some unusual strategy of action 
to turn a ‘settled’ society into an ‘unsettled’ one. All societies, even the most traditional, must cope 
with the sporadic emergence of these phenomena, that usually are considered deviant (and in Parsons’ 
approach are constructed as such even at the theoretical level). What makes a society ‘unsettled’ is that 
alternative ways of representing situations and alternative strategies of action can credibly lay claim to 
the same status, the same assertability conditions, the same degree of entrenchment as those considered 
as consolidated. 
 
The most interesting point of Swidler’s theorization seems to me to be the contradistinction she 
makes between culture’s features in ‘settled’ and ‘unsettled’ periods. In settled periods, culture is 
made up of ‘traditions’, i.e. articulated beliefs and practices that are varied rather than uniform, not 
comprehensive but partial, do not command an enthusiastic consensus, and do not become flags to 
fight for, but are taken for granted. As we have said, they seem to be an unavoidable part of our 
lives. As Swidler (1986, 279) writes,  
traditions, whether the routine ones of daily life of the extraordinary ones of communal 
ceremony, nonetheless seem ordained in the order of things, so that people may rest in the 
certainty that they exist, without necessarily participating in them. 
A culture’s presenting itself as ‘settled’ often obscures the fact that its origins are likely varied and 
fragmented, and that only adjustment over time, if not violence and indoctrination, made it ‘settled’-- 
which, as I have already stressed, does not mean coherent and systematic, but only taken for granted 
and obvious. 
 
As mentioned above, acceptance of emerging new ideologies is much more conscious. 
Precisely because they feel they are engaged in the struggle to establish a new way of seeing things 
and therefore of living, people who are learning new ways of organizing individual and collective 
action and practicing customs that are not yet familiar to them pay attention to the shaping of their 
actions by the new doctrine, symbols and rituals they want to establish. Most importantly, they feel 
committed to represent their behavior to third parties as shaped by the new reference system they 
are struggling for. Swidler (1986, 279) characterizes ideologies as ‘explicit cultures’ that, although 
they are themselves imperfectly coherent and definitely non-comprehensive systems,21 “aspire to 
                                                
21 Swidler (1986, 279) emphasizes how ideologies by their very nature cannot provide “the underlying assumptions of 
an entire way of life, they make explicit demands in a contested cultural arena. Their independent causal influence is 
limited first because at least at their origins, such ideological movements are not complete cultures, in the sense that 
much of their taken-for-granted understanding of the world and many of their daily practices still depend on traditional 
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offer […] one unified answer to the question of how human beings should live”. In other words, 
they aspire to present themselves as coherent and comprehensive because otherwise they could not 
struggle for prevailing over the worldviews, assumptions, attitudes proposed by rival models that 
have the advantage of a consolidated entrenchment.  
 
I wish to stress how ideologies’ way of presenting themselves makes them very similar to 
culture in Parsons’ meaning, namely, as an axiological monad configuring individuals’ actions. 
Individuals acting on behalf of an ideology see themselves as “cultural dopes”, as instruments of the 
ideology itself, and want other members of society to take the same attitude. The other important 
point I wish to emphasize is that, as Swidler (1986, 279) argues, “the same belief system – a religion, 
for example – may be held by some people as an ideology and by others as tradition; and what has 
been tradition may under certain historical circumstances become ideology”.22  
 
This conceptual framework enables us to see that we have fallen into a trap and the more we 
move, following the old roads to escape, the more the trap tightens around us and takes away all hope 
of escaping it. According to the conception of order based on the sharing of values, hence of cultures, 
the very idea of an ‘unsettled society’ is almost an oxymoron. A society in which the settlement of 
cultural devices is problematic and conflict-ridden because individuals, groups or whole societies are 
divided, adopt different resources to categorize the situations and decide strategies for action and “are 
involved in constructing new strategies of action” (Swidler 1986, 278),23 is not a society. It is a 
conflicting conglomerate of individuals without any order. It is a temporary situation bound to turn into 
an order. 
 
As we have said, even if one does not accept uncritically Bauman’s view, one cannot deny that 
modernity has been characterized by an ever faster movement of ideas, capitals and people, and that 
during the last thirty years-- in the period that we call the age of globalization-- this speed has become 
dizzy24. This fact, together with the development of the cultural industry that in the West has become a 
driving force and often spreads the paradigms of meaning and the imagery that later make the 
development of material production possible, has led to a widespread perception of living what I would 
name ‘unsettled lives’. We are often anguished by a feeling of having to deal with situations in which 
                                                                                                                                                            
patterns.” “Even the most fanatical ideological movement, which seeks to remake completely the cultural capacities of its 
members, will inevitably draw on many tacit assumptions from the existing culture” (Swidler 1986, 278). 
22 Geertz stresses that this phenomenon is characterizing part of contemporary Islam, where religion no longer rests 
upon individual belief but is becoming its cause. 
23 Swidler emphasizes that it is in the analysis of these periods that the traditional notion of culture appears inadequate. 
24 On this we cannot but refer to the theories, however questioned and questionable, by Paul Virilio. See in particular his 
Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology. New York. Semiotext(e), 1977. 
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we cannot rely on our traditional routines and, even worse, of the ineffectiveness of our efforts to cope 
with these new situations, to find ways of adjusting to them. Any adjustment, as soon as it begins to 
take shape and however quickly it takes shape, is already outdated because we have to cope with many 
other new ways of seeing things and situations, many other strategies of behavior. Subjectively we 
have the feeling to be overwhelmed by an epochal change; we think that our lives are no longer 
normally ‘settled lives’ lived in ‘settled societies’. In other words, we feel that we are living in 
‘unsettled’ societies, and that the chance to live in a ‘settled period’ is a lucky favorable circumstance 
(somebody may consider it the unlucky circumstance of living in an enclave isolated from the rest of 
the world, it all depends on temporary subjective perception). Turning Swidler’s approach upside 
down, we could say that today we have a sense of living rare ‘settled periods’ – when the ways of 
action seem obvious to us and to our interlocutors – that emerge in the middle of a situation that is 
generally ‘unsettled’ – when we have to deal with people who seem willing to impose alien ways of 
seeing and behaving upon us. The problem of governing multicultural societies is ultimately how to 
allow individuals to live a ‘settled life’ in societies that, according to our usual standards, are 
‘unsettled’. 
 
All strategies for governing multicultural societies have implicitly assumed that individuals can 
only live in an environment characterized by cognitive and strategic repertoires that look natural to 
them, and that are deeply entrenched. This assumption may be acceptable; our psychological, 
anthropological and sociological knowledge tells us that the very idea of individual identity is 
troublesome without such an environment. What appears tragically wrong in the light of Swidler’s 
account is the strategy followed to achieve this goal. For seeing order and stability as the product of 
shared values -- that is, thinking of culture à la Parsons in terms of an axiological monad-- it assumes 
that only a long homogenization of cognitive and strategic repertoires guaranteed by old national 
cultures allows for the development of a ‘settled’ society.25 That is, it assumes that only a consolidation 
of these repertoires into a national or ethnic culture allows for a ‘settled’ society and, therefore, for the 
development of ‘settled lives’.26 
 
                                                
25 This thesis is the premise of Bouchard’s view on the fundamental importance of national identity for the existence of 
a state (see Bouchard 2011). But it also explains why national identities were built at the cost of massacres and 
deportations, creating institutions for mass disciplining and the myths of ethnic identities. Over half a century ago, the 
need to protect the prevalent culture, understood traditionally as a set of values, to avoid the breakdown of society, was 
the topic of the well known controversy between Lord Devlin and Herbert Hart. 
26 See Kymlicka (1995, 18): “I am using ‘a culture’ as synonymous with ‘a nation’ or ‘a people’ – that is, as an 
intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a 
distinct language and history. And a state is multicultural if its members either belong to different nations (a multination 
state), or have emigrated from different nations (a polyethnic state), and if this fact is an important aspect of personal 
identity and political life”. 
Emilio Santoro
www.adir.unifi.it - ISSN 1827-0565
 19 
This strategy appears flawed because it is ground in the idea that different cultures correspond 
to different value systems, basically consistent and non-contradictory internally, rather than different 
conceptual and strategic tools that are in any event plural, rival and often conflicting. Most importantly, 
it ignores that ‘settled cultures’ support varied and often even conflicting patterns of action, and hence,  
appears to be inconsistent and self-defeating: its core is the transformation of cultural traditions-- i.e. 
unspoken, non-thematized, flexible and ever imperceptibly evolving equipments that can account for 
opposing and contradictory actions and situations-- into ideologies. It involves a widespread belief that, 
in order to regain the feeling of relative safety guaranteed by routine, individuals must re-establish their 
culture in everyday life, must struggle for it, and that states must do the same using laws. This strategy 
is paradoxical because, as we have seen, the attempt to establish a culture as an ideology creates 
‘unsettled’ societies: the chosen means move the pursued end away and make it unattainable. 
 
What counts for the possibility to live a ‘settled life’ is that the cognitive and strategic resources 
available to actors are entrenched, allowing them to behave in ways that they consider --and others 
perceive as-- natural. In other words, it is crucial that individuals do not think they are acting in some 
free-floating heritage of ideas, myths, or symbols, but that they have a wide range of consolidated and 
accepted possibilities of action. The building of this range of consolidated possibilities, however, does 
not require, unlike what has often been the case in the past, that qualitatively and quantitatively 
relevant novelties introduced from time to time pass through a long settlement period that produces the 
ethnicization or nationalization of the various resources by merging them into what is considered one 
culture. It is worth emphasizing that such a mistake is shared by both assimilationist and 
multiculturalist policies, the only difference being that for the latter it is crucial to turn the traditions of 
ethnic minorities and not only those of majorities into ideologies.  
 
The idea that cultures, either majorities’ or minorities’, need protection (like pandas) reifies 
cultures and turns them into coherent static entities with defined boundaries. By advocating the 
struggle for their protection, this reification turns cultural traditions into ideologies and establishes the 
idea that the winners are those who sharpen differences and their intangibility. This approach betrays 
the historical development of cultural traditions that have always been mixing and transforming; 
sometimes they have vanquished and disappeared, sometimes they have merged and given rise to 
different formations. Often these changes have not even been perceived and thematised, or they 
have been so only in historical perspective, long after their occurrence. As we have seen, cultures 
have always been entities with uncertain borders and steadily moving in an often imperceptible 
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way. Their continuity has always been decided, in an apodictic and unavoidably arbitrary manner, 
by their members.  
Cultural difference as strategic value for constructing settled societies 
 
The debate between assimilationism, even in its mild and dialogic form, and 
multiculturalism is a dangerous ‘intellectualist’ game that in fact gives rise to destructive power 
clashes. For it is clear that in our societies cultures blend without too many problems when their 
members come in touch in relatively frivolous areas (music, food, travel, exchanges, etc.27) and 
when they interact on a relatively equal footing. The problems of cultural bewilderment and the 
destruction of cultural identities arise abruptly when we have to deal with problems concerning 
trickier and more vital sectors: work, socio-economic conditions, relations of power and 
domination. 
 
Yet, the safe road to ‘liberal’ equality does not depend upon its ideologization but rather on 
a cultural repertoire that allows for making sense of actions and situations even if they do not 
appear shareable. We will not escape this trap if we look for a close-ended dialogue that will 
eventually lead, through overlapping consensus or communicative or empathic action, to a common 
‘liberal’ agreement on, and view of, the problems we face. The only way out that seems viable to 
me is to prone the widespread adoption of a toolkit plural enough to allow for more than one correct 
solution to these problems, to make each chosen solution appear reasonable (at least to the extent 
that it meets the needs of people actually involved). We should therefore adopt a strategy that 
continues what has always happened in the cases of cultural encounters: the formation of toolkits 
that make many contradictories actions and diverse strategies seem normal, in order to cope with a 
variety of problems. I think the acceleration of intercultural encounters (as well as of intracultural 
problems without solutions guaranteed by shared assertability conditions) only requires an 
awareness that we need to favor the rapid production of what has always been produced gradually 
and tacitly. The first move this awareness should lead us to make, the first move to govern societies 
that seem to be irreducibly multicultural, is to make the largest possible number of conflicts local 
rather than vital. This can be done by shifting decision making from the level of general rules to that 
of resolving specific conflicts-- a strategy very different from—indeed, opposed to-- the 
ideologization of cultures. 
 
                                                
27 It is telling that when culture is ideologized, even these areas become objects of confrontation: some Italian mayors 
have prohibited the specialized sale of ethnic food. 
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The life of multicultural societies shows that new elements in the repertoire of cognitive and 
strategic resources can become more easily and quickly entrenched if they are thought of as relating to 
particular sectors of life (familiar, professional, financial, recreational, etc.) and to certain relations with 
particular people or between particular people (family members, foreigners, sick persons, women, 
children, etc.). This channel of entrenching or naturalizing ways of seeing and behaving seems able to 
bring many other ways of cataloguing things or acting in the toolkit of solutions perceived, at least 
locally, as legitimately available, without going through their slow ethnicization. One of the most 
striking cases is polygamy. While in Italy polygamy is not legally recognized, and is indeed a criminal 
offence, it has become part of the social world through the protection of children’s right to grow up 
assisted by both parents. This right allows the parent who had remained abroad to enter and stay in the 
national territory even if the parent who is already resident in Italy with the minor is married and lives 
with another spouse. 
  
Thus, to build a set of legitimately available cultural resources it is not important that they are 
thought of as ‘common’. Nationals, too, have a perception that they live in a multicultural society and 
share the idea that, within borders to be drawn from time to time, everyone may behave as he or she 
thinks natural. In many situations in which they do not feel directly involved in a conflict, they are 
ready to accept that others may use toolkits that appear to them weird or unconceivable. This readiness 
and the resulting use of these cultural toolkits makes them more and more familiar and less weird and 
inconceivable, and therefore more and more part of the cognitive and strategic tools the agent himself 
or his interlocutors may legitimately resort to. In other words, the integration of cultural tools, like the 
integration of people, need not proceed through their assimilation but may also happen through the 
recognition and acceptation of their differences. 
 
In my view, the most important pragmatic suggestion of the new conceptualization of 
culture and in particular of Swidler’s account is this. If a society is characterized by the presence of 
minorities that explicitly take different cognitive and strategic toolkits as schemes in which to 
ground their actions, and if we are to manage such a society without taking an authoritarian stance, 
we need to avoid reifying ‘cultures’, turning them into ideologies by essentializing or nationalizing 
or ethnicizing them. Any ‘cultural tradition’ is by its very nature hybrid and ‘contaminated’, always 
contradictory, and changes through the actual experiences of its ‘holders’. Anthropologists 
emphasize that cultures are entities that change imperceptibly but continuously through the 
everyday interactions of their members (or holders). Most changes are silent, not thematized; the 
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problem of their adaptation to contingent situations is not tackled. When this problem is raised, 
normally adaptation is justified through a variety of ad hoc clauses. 
  
The reification of cultures, their ideologization, makes any reasonable compromise 
impossible. As Swidler correctly saw, it forces us to live in unsettled societies. The majority’s 
requesting migrants to give up their own identities, for which they have only hostility, often hinders 
the possibility for them to build a new identity. Old identities become havens, and tend to become 
sclerosed in forms more traditionalist and conservative than those they take in the countries of 
origin. Perceived hostility prevents interaction and with it, the hybridization of cultures. As soon as 
we come to discuss the constitutive core elements of a culture, if we take the point of view of the 
culture itself and its stubborn preservation, all kind of compromise appears unacceptable, for it 
transforms it, turns it into a different culture. 
  
We should begin with observing that cultures do not talk with each other, do not debate, do 
not conflict. It is people that do. To speak of conflicting or incompatible cultures is, on the one 
hand, to reify cultures, to sclerose them and deprive them of their natural continuous modifiability 
(Dal Lago 2006). On the other hand, it is to repeat Parsons’ mistake and to force people to see 
themselves as mere holders of a culture, as robots that follow a planned scheme. Discussing of 
‘cultures’ rather than individuals denies people’s dignity; it is a theoretical move that, as I have said, 
silently turns individuals into ‘cultural dopes’, into mere reproducers of dominant cultural rules 
(taken as unified and coherent), by denying their identities as active subjects and skilled users of the 
horizons of meaning they live in. Normally, (migrant) men and women are first of all people busy 
surviving and not (or only incidentally) making their culture survive. The interactions in which 
individuals are involved continuously redefine the language game and unnoticeably modify the 
cultural tools of all interlocutors. 
  
Even if ‘culture’ is conceived of as a cognitive and strategic repertoire, it can be understood 
at best as a Weberian ideal type, i.e., as an analytical tool that in a given situation allows the 
interpreter-- the social scientist-- to make sense of a person’s action in this way. If a person were a 
culturally determined machine, she would act like this. Examining how she actually acted and the 
difference between the actual and the expected action helps us reconstruct the actor’s motivations 
and the influences that shaped them: ultimately, the cultural tradition itself.28 To reduce culture to 
                                                
28 It is worth emphasizing that a possible outcome of Weber’s account is to realize that the ideal type of culture has been 
built mistakenly, i.e. associated more with reference texts than the actions of a community’s members. It is not 
coincidental that Weber emphasizes the difficulties with building ideal types that can be safely used to analyze actions. 
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an ideal type, as mentioned above, does not mean that ‘culture’ is not a social force, a social fact, 
but only that its boundaries are elusive by the very definition of culture. There is no such thing as an 
object that can be defined a culture with exact boundaries. There are many versions of every 
culture, perhaps as many as the individuals referring to it and the interactions in which they are 
involved: individuals, though different from each other, interact with each other building a 
recognizable and recognized space, a horizon of meaning through which members of the same 
community speak not only to each other but to the ‘others’. This horizon is not finite or definite: 
meaning changes continuously with the changing of the discourses that reproduce and are produced 
by it. 
 
If we drop the idea that we should look for a compromise between cultures, and try and 
solve just the problems of individual people-- that is, individuals having personalities that are 
normally formed within a culture-- then the enterprise is made easier. The first element that should 
be stressed is the strong conditioning power of the language game and its assertability conditions. 
Sociologists studying the techniques of neutralization have shown that, when choosing an 
argumentative strategy to justify actions perceived by other players of the language game as 
blameworthy or views perceived as untenable, people usually tend to refer to reasons shared by 
those who are supposed to accept the justification. 
 
Studies of accountability (Garfinkel 1967) were mostly developed in the fields of the 
sociology of deviance and social psychology with a view to describing the cognitive processes 
through which individuals build the reports of their actions when requested to account for them in 
terms of personal responsibility. This phenomenon occurs whenever an individual has to reconstruct 
his or her action and give a public justification of it. Then there emerges the actors’ tendency to 
build or preserve a positive image of themselves through techniques allowing them to displace, or in 
any event to weaken, responsibility for breaking some rule of the normative system under which 
they feel judged. Different authors that have treated this subject have worked out various typologies 
of neutralization techniques, excuses, defenses, concessions and denials (Matza 1969). According to 
a well known study by Donald Cressey (1954), when charged with theft the rich tend to allege 
kleptomania as a defense, the poor the state of necessity.29 Similarly, it is normal that in liberal 
societies, characterized by the protection of religious differences and religious freedom, people 
                                                
29 According to Cressey the mystery can be explained by the hypothesis that people of higher culture had a chance to 
know about this disease (for this reason he considers this as an example of the relevance of differential association for 
deviance) and use this knowledge to make their behavior more acceptable in their own and others’ eyes.  
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think, sometimes mistakenly, that religion is itself an acceptable justification.30 Such a justification 
could not be alleged and is not put forward in a theocratic society, or a religion-centered society. A 
striking example is progressive Islam arguing for what seem to us classical liberal rights on the 
basis of arguments that appeal to Islam itself rather than the liberal tradition. 
 
It is important to stress that, as Wright Mills (1963) argued, these defenses are not mere ad 
hoc ‘excuses’. They are not attempts to rationalize ex post what we did, but conceptual schemes 
widespread in certain contexts (in particular, multicultural contexts31) that direct individuals’ 
actions by making behaviors, that without a neutralizing language would be viewed as unviable 
options, appear justified. Their widespread use creates the outline of a plural—multicultural-- 
language game. To use a reificationist language, it creates a pluricultural or pluriethnic toolkit that 
is considered acceptable and is likely in the medium term to be used thoughtlessly, that is, without 
being perceived as originally pluriethnic. 
 
 As mentioned above, today’s societies have been made highly complex by migrations, as 
well as technology and the speed of information transmission. Most importantly, and this makes the 
problem trickier, they become every day more articulated and multiform. In these circumstances 
bewilderment often results from the lack of cognitive and strategic means to cope with situations 
that appear totally new, or at any rate such that we realize that we have no toolkit enabling us to 
respond in a quick, automatic and safe way. The plurality of toolkits and their dialogue seem to be 
fundamental cognitive and strategic resources to cope with the steady increase of social complexity. 
In other words, if this plurality is managed without reifying (that is, ideologizing) cultures it does 
not appear as a factor of cultural shock but as a means through which we can, painstakingly, try and 
reduce the bewilderment caused by social complexity. 
 
 During the last years the reification of cultures and the emphasis on ethnic pluralism have 
concealed the fact that ‘cultural shock’ does not result only from exogenous causes, the encounter 
with other cultures, but also, and to a relevant degree, from endogenous causes. They have moved 
to the background the fact that it is changes in technologies and the circulation of information that 
made our equipment of cognitive and strategic resources appear inadequate in many situations. 
                                                
30 For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the individual right to freedom o religion and conscience allows 
Sikhs to carry kirpan -- a sort of ritual knife-- in schools, in schools. We could cite dozens of judicial rulings that allow 
abstractly forbidden behaviors in the name of religious freedom and its corollary of tolerance. 
31 After all focus on and study of techniques of neutralization stem from Edwin Sutherland’s and Donald Cressey’s 
(1960) well known analysis of differential association. 
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Moreover, by representing cultures as black boxes characterized by ultimate values and ends, they 
made their plurality seem only a cause of the problem and not a key resource for its solution. 
 
It is essential not to value each individual culture as an individual good, a conception 
implied by such approaches as Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s, which consider culture an “irreducibly 
social good” or a “primary good”, but rather to value cultures’ plurality and dialogue as a collective 
good. For, in contemporary complex societies, a subjectivity developed within a single culture, a 
black box of practices pointing to a specific set of ultimate values, is inevitably bound to live an 
‘unsettled life’. It is bound to deal with continuous bewilderment resulting from encounters with 
situations for which it lacks the appropriate cognitive and strategic tools. In settled periods, that is, in 
periods without contact between competing cultural repertoires and without deep and abrupt social 
change, people naturally ‘know’ how to act because their toolkit constrains action by providing a 
limited set of resources out of which individuals and groups construct strategies of action. Therefore, 
when social situation changes continuously and deeply the perception of living ‘settled lives’ cannot be 
saved by ideologizing existing cultural bonds. They would not provide us with the cognitive and 
strategic resources needed to cope with the different situations facing us, since the stimulus of the 
contact between different toolkits is lacking. 
 
In this context, I think we should recover the spirit of John Stuart Mill’s view that pluralism 
is a fundamental value because it makes the enrichment of personalities possible through dialogue. 
This unending enrichment is crucial to living settled lives in complex societies steadily and quickly 
changing. Mill emphasizes that freedom of speech is necessary to guarantee the self-realization of 
all members of the community, not just of those expressing minority opinions. The stimulus of 
dissenters is fundamental for the critical development of orthodox individuals’ personality, for it 
helps prevent them from sinking into conformist positions: 
those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil, should consider 
in the first place, that in consequence of it there is never any fair and thorough 
discussion of heretical opinions; and that such of them as could not stand such a 
discussion, though they may be prevented from spreading, do not disappear. But it 
is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most, by the ban placed on all 
inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done is 
to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, 
and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy (Mill 2001a, 32). 
Mill’s thesis, of course, should be transposed into the current context. Mill had in mind a traditional 
notion of culture  as characterized by a set of ultimate ends and values. In his view, the individual 
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involved in the dialogue with other cultures is revisiting his values, and this makes him appear 
almost as an existentialist hero or a Nietzschean superman. Mill’s individual ‘of character’ is an 
individual reflecting on his worldviews, dialoguing with different points of view and distinguishing 
the suggestions he identifies with from those he perceives as the mere product of external influences, 
and refusing on reasoned grounds those that go against his opinions. Today’s unsettled societies 
seem only to require the craftsman of social practices theorized by ethnomethodologists, who moves 
cautiously but unbiased among the different cultural and strategic tools that he finds in the social 
texture, to deal with often new situations and the often unprecedented tasks he has to perform. 
 
Moreover, Mill’s views remind us that often people do not readily take advantage of new 
structural opportunities which would require them to abandon established ways of life. This is not 
because they cling to cultural values, but more trivially because they are reluctant to abandon familiar 
strategies of action for which they have the cultural ‘equipment’. When cultures seem to give 
unequivocal directions, when they seem to constrain action over time, this happens mainly because of 
the high costs of cultural retooling to adopt new patterns of action. To the extent that in today’s 
societies the chance of living a settled life is tied chiefly to the availability of cognitive and strategic 
tools to manage complexity, it is crucial to preserve the plurality of available toolkits and the ensuing 
dialogue, and to overcome our natural preferred tie with one of them,32 because we are likely to pay for 
this reticence and will end up feeling inadequate to our very societies. In other words, it is fundamental 
to remember that, as Mill wrote, 
capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, 
not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority 
of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in 
life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not 
favorable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise (Mill 2001b, 13).33 
                                                
32 Mill is very severe with those who yield to this sluggishness: “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different opinion, it is 
because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides” (Mill, 
2001b). Because of this position Mill is strongly hostile to any form of traditionalist culture which tends to isolate 
individuals from dialoguing with others and is intolerant of dissenters. Of course he is, on the one hand, a son of his 
own time and, on the other, a human being, hence inconsistent and capable of endorsing contradictory principles at the 
same time. Therefore we should not be surprised that in other writings he proves to be all but open to understanding the 
culture of ‘others’. For instance, he considered the Indian culture as expressing a humanity not yet civilized, whose 
members could and should be treated as children. 
33 Of course, otherness is a reciprocal concept: to members of the host society the cultures of ‘others’ are those of 
migrants, but for migrants the culture of ‘others’ are those of the host society and other migrant communities. Natives 
and migrants are mutually dissenters and their dialogue allows the development of the personality not only of members 
of the host society but of migrants as well. 
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Some debates on multiculturalism in Tuscany: the emerging value of difference 
 
In Tuscany, an approach of this kind has stimulated a debate on teaching in schools with a 
high number of children from migrant families. In the city of Prato, where there is a high 
concentration of Chinese, Chinese children make up half of the students in some classes. Italian 
families experience this situation as a serious problem. They often angrily remark that their children 
are forced to learn more slowly because teachers have to take care of Chinese children’s ability to 
follow their lessons. People have been discussing for two years on the opportunity to tackle the 
problem in a totally different way. Given the importance taken by Chinese language and culture, 
and the impressive economic growth that made China the second economic power worldwide, some 
are proposing to attach the same importance to Chinese children learning Italian and to Italian 
children learning Chinese culture and language. In other words, the idea is that in the complex 
society that is going to develop in the next twenty years, mastery of the Chinese cognitive and 
strategic toolkit will be a fundamental resource, and nothing favors the acquisition of this toolkit 
more than attending the whole school cycle, from nursery to high school, with a Chinese 
schoolmate. Thus, school boards are planning an experiment with mixed classes where two 
languages and two cultures, Italian and Chinese, are taught since the nursery and children socialized 
in one culture by their families can help to teach their culture to their class mates from families with 
a different culture. By the time of parents’ choice the didactic program of these classes present a 
slower learning of Italian language and culture not as an annoyance that will emerge during the 
school year but as a choice rewarded by the gradual learning of Chinese culture and language. A 
similar debate is developing, though more slowly, mostly because of the minor appeal of this 
language and culture, about the opportunity to start a similar experiment with Arabic. 
 
Another important evidence of the advantages of complementing different toolkits in the 
management of complex problems was given by a debate on female genital mutilations in Italy. 
Some years ago the Florence Bioethics Committee noticed that many little girls, mostly but not 
solely from the Horn of Africa, continued to suffer genital mutilations, either clandestinely in Italy 
or, much more frequently, when coming back for holidays to their original countries. The 
Committee proposed to replace female circumcision with a symbolic needle prick, performed in 
medical facilities and accompanied by all social rituals and celebrations demanded by families. 
Behind this proposal there was a long work of colloquia with families from the Horn of Africa that 
had shown how the social pressure for the infibulation of little girls was unsustainable for mothers, 
Emilio Santoro
www.adir.unifi.it - ISSN 1827-0565
 28 
especially when returning to their country of origin.34 They had also shown that the needle prick, 
together with the ceremony, was considered a ritual suitable to mark the passage from a little girl to 
a woman, hence sufficient to convince the community that infibulation was no longer necessary. 
During the same period a member of the Committee had been addressed by an adult Somali girl 
who had asked Florence medical services to be infibulated. She suffered terribly for the fact that all 
boys of her community refused her because she was not infibulated, and she did not want an Italian 
partner. 
 
The Committee’s proposal met with very angry reactions that blocked its implementation. 
However, after the scandal had abated, the region of Tuscany, that had been requested to prohibit 
the practice strictly as illegal, after wide discussion and consultation found it totally legitimate. 
While this advice did not lead to the adoption of the symbolic gesture, it allowed an extensive 
debate in which the new perspective held by women from the Horn of Africa began to be used to 
discuss many practices that, though lawful, in the political-cultural arena seem to lack assertability 
conditions unanimously considered entrenched (that is, obvious). A reflection has started on some 
facts that I quickly enumerate. In Italy 1) it is women’s right to their psychic health that justifies 
legal abortion; 2) it is accepted that an individual’s right to his or her psychic health justifies 
surgical modification of his or her genitalia, even though epidemiologic studies have shown the 
relevant problems of psychic equilibrium that people who underwent this surgery may run into; 3) 
similarly it is accepted that people, including minors, may undergo surgery for purely aesthetic 
reasons. At this point it has been asked what prevented this very same right to psychic health from 
being accepted as a justification to allow the more or less serious genital mutilation known as 
infibulation, when requested by an adult woman alleging the psychic sufferance caused by being 
seen as different within her community, or arguing that an infibulated vagina is part of her concept 
of beauty. This new approach to the problem led to thematize that, regardless of surgery or harm to 
personal physical integrity, a range of bodily manipulations are recognized as having an 
emancipating value and expressing personal autonomy, whereas the practice of infibulation is 
considered a cultural imposition and a sexist vexation of women. This is the reason why even a 
needle prick has been perceived as illegitimate, because it conveyed the message of women’s 
condition of inferiority. This of course has led to a debate on whether aesthetic surgery is itself 
something women resort to in order to pursue a male-imposed or commercial model of beauty. 
 
                                                
34 It is not unusual for mothers and fathers to report that infibulation had been performed by grandparents, who found 
the practice normal and natural, when children were with them and parents in Italy. 
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As I said, this discussion did not have any practical impact, but I think it produced, at least 
in some environments, a great result in terms of awareness, critical capacity and recognition of the 
importance of others’ points of view, possibly when we are harshly faced with them, for shedding 
light on the limitations of our practices and objective catalogues. In other words, it helped show 
how cultures are not black boxes set up around different values but, on the contrary, tools for the 
management of occurrences, often in the name of the same values. 
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